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SIXTY YEARS OF CYBERNETICS
Cybernetics Still Alive
Ivan M. Havel
This informal essay, written on the occasion of 60th anniversary of Wienerian cyber-
netics, presents a series of themes and ideas that has emerged during last several decades
and which have direct or indirect relationships to the principal concepts of cybernetics.
Moreover, they share with original cybernetics the same transdisciplinary character.1
Keywords: cybernetics, general systems, transdisciplinarity, feedback, self-reference, collec-
tive phenomena, scales, hierarchies, emergence, downward causation, connect-
nism, chaos, autopoiesis, domains of discourse, causal domains, metaphors
1. INTRODUCTION
Cybernetics makes poets of us because it provides
abstract descriptions that make metaphors possible.
Mary C. Bateson2
Sixty years ago a peculiar science emerged under the name cybernetics [25]. Un-
like standard natural sciences it was not interested in ordinary things like bricks,
clocks, or frogs, but rather in certain phenomena, relations, effects, and processes
that in various disguises occur in many, otherwise dissimilar situations. In the
framework of theoretical cybernetics (unlike of some its later practical applications)
various more or less familiar concepts – like feedback, homeostasis, control, finite
automata, celular automata, logical or switching networks, information, entropy, sig-
nals, messages, communication, adaptation, stability, oscillation, self-organization,
self-reproduction, etc. – are studied with emphasis primarily on such their aspects
that frees them from concrete material carriers. Thus cybernetical studies set out
for a journey across traditional divides between scientific disciplines – exemplifying
a truly transdisciplinary endeavor.
Perhaps due to its distinctive nature, cybernetics in the Soviet block survived
the period of scorn by communist ideologists of early 1950’s, as well as of affected
exaltations by the same ideologists only a few years later. Paradoxically, in Western
1The paper draws heavily, with revision, from various my earlier works, especially from [3]-[10]
The research was sponsored by the Research Program CTS MSM 021620845.
2Quoted from her lecture in Crestone, Colorado, August 1998.
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countries cybernetics gradually lost the status of an independent major discipline
under that name, having been dissolved into various different fields like automata
theory, control theory, system science, computer science, artificial intelligence, and
somewhat later, into newly emerging areas of nonlinear science, complexity studies,
network analysis, and certain topics in cognitive science.
I am not an advocate of trying to invent a precise and comprehensive definition
of cybernetics for the 21st century. I am afraid that any definition would eventu-
ally confine cybernetics within strict disciplinary boundaries and render it just as an
ordinary discipline in the conventional sense. This would deprive it of its original, in-
herently transdisciplinary character. Should we call it cybernetics, post-cybernetics
or something else, we have to have in mind that we view it as an open area of study,
always prepared to embrace entirely new themes, concepts, ideas, and theories. In
spite of, and in addition to, their often formal and abstract conceptions, they may
appear to be productive by enabling a metaphorical transfer of concepts from one
to another scientific area.
In this essay I am going to present several ad hoc chosen samples of such ideas
or concepts – some recent, some perhaps not so widely known, and some not yet
conceptualized – that in one or another way keep on the transdisciplinary spirit
conceived by the founding fathers of cybernetics. My intention is not to present a
representative survey of such ideas and the limited space allows me only to outline
them in a sketchy and informal way; moreover, I will not stick to the chronological
order of their emergence in the history of cybernetics.
2. GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY AND TRANSDISCIPLINARITY
The pervasive concept of a system attracted theoreticians already in the early 1950’s.
In 1954, a group of scientists representing various fields gathered around Ludwig
von Bertalanffy in a research centre in Palo Alto, California. There they developed
among themselves a stimulating resonance across disciplines, and in recognition of its
importance they established the Society for Research of General Systems. For some
reasons it was a time pregnant with cross-fertilization, interconnections, and cross-
breeding of scientific fields. They formulated a manifesto comprising four principal
tasks to be pursued (quoted from Klir [16, p. 33]):
1. To investigate the isomorphy of concepts, laws, and models from various fields,
and to help in useful transfers from one field to another;
2. To encourage development of adequate theoretical models in fields which lack
them;
3. To minimize the duplication of theoretical effort in different fields; and
4. To promote the unity of science through improving communication among
specialists.
I can hardly imagine a more apt articulation of the idea of transdisciplinarity.
Indeed, the attribute “transdisciplinary” can be associated with insights, motives,
themes, principles, concepts, and ideas each of which is meaningful in a number
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(typically in many) of disciplines and perhaps even transcends them; it may ap-
pear in multifarious concrete shapes, forms and variations. I repeat and add some
newer examples: feedback, information, entropy, representation, complexity, hier-
archy, complementarity, evolution, stability, fluctuation, chaos, critical phenomena,
catastrophes, synergy, collective behavior, emergence, adaptation, order, and various
“selfs”: self-similarity, self-reference, self-reproduction, and self-organization.
Notice that we may talk about (concrete) transdisciplinary concepts as well as
about transdisciplinary research methodology.
3. FEEDBACK, SELF–REFERENCE, AND STRANGE LOOPS
The most paradigmatic principle of cybernetics, that of feedback, had been familiar
to many scientists and engineers already before its transdisciplinary nature was
accented by Norbert Wiener and his colleagues. The principle is so commonly used
that the enigmatic charm inherent to the reciprocal efficacy associated with the
feedback is rarely appreciated. It is more salient in the case of some other reciprocal
phenomena, among them the phenomenon of self-reference being the most inspiring
one.
Physical realizations of the ordinary feedback loop, whether in technology, biol-
ogy, or society, have either a dumping or amplifying effect, and in addition they may
trigger an oscillatory behavior. The associated processes necessarily evolve in real
physical time. In contrast, the concept of self-reference transcends that of feedback
by putting forth two essential options: first, the relationship may have an atemporal
nature, and second, it may lead from one to another domain of discourse, for instance
from the level of syntax to the level of semantics (as already the word “reference”
indicates).
In the late 70’s there appeared a famous book Gödel, Escher, Bach by Douglas
Hofstadter [11]. In a witty and readable way, the book exposed various disguises
of self-reference and reciprocal links in sciences, literature, and arts. He discussed
many cases of what he calls strange loop: something returns to a state that should
have been abandoned forever. Somebody utters a statement that is turned, by this
very act of uttering, into falsehood (the well-known liar’s paradox). A phonograph
is destroyed by the vibrations of the sound it plays back. Computer algorithm re-
cursively calls itself as a subroutine. A close-loop video camera scans its own screen.
And last but not least, there is the ingenious idea behind Gödel’s incompleteness
theorem of mathematical logic. Unlike as in the case of ordinary feedback loops,
strange loops always reveal something extraordinary that often escapes a scientific
account in the classical sense.
Such phenomena can be always rendered in a twofold way: either in the unfolded
form of an infinite process evolving in real or mental time, or in the enfolded atem-
poral form. The former case may help in explaining the phenomenon in question,
the latter may yield a paradox – and a paradox often leads to a much deeper insight.
The unfoldment and enfoldment are two complementary conceptions, and this very
complementarity could be viewed as an epistemological contribution with cybernetic
roots.
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4. COLLECTIVE PHENOMENA
Almost anything in physics, nature and society that is scientifically interesting due to
its inherent complexity exhibits a common characteristic: it consists of a multitude
of elements or components which either influence, support and complement each
other, or else which somehow compete, fight, push and stamp each other out. It
may be electrons in heavy atoms, atoms in large molecules, molecules in matter,
matter in continents. It may be cells in organs, organs in organisms, organisms
in species, species in ecosystems. It may also be citizens in nations, nations in
regions. It may be elements in logical circuits, circuits in computers, computers
in computer networks. Individual data within scientific hypotheses, hypotheses in
scientific disciplines, disciplines in the entire body of knowledge.
Due to the continuing interest by system theoreticians, students of synergy, statis-
ticians and other interdisciplinary specialists, we are now on the verge of finding
universal principles providing us with a unifying view of the above mentioned va-
riety of collective systems. I cannot help but believe that when such principles are
uncovered, we will be astonished by their simplicity.
Statistical physics is one of the classical disciplines relatively advanced in that
direction. Already in the nineteenth century, Ludwig Boltzmann and his followers
created a conceptual system which makes it possible to talk about characteristics of
macro-systems (systems which surround us) in terms of the common or collective
properties of particles (atoms or molecules). While the immense number of parti-
cles prevents us from describing global behavior in terms of microstates (complete
collections of states of all particles) we may rather work with macrostates (each rep-
resenting a large set of micro-states with a certain common macroscopic property).
If done properly, nothing gets lost (nobody will ever see any microstate anyway) and
a better understanding of reality may even be achieved.
Statistical laws help to understand the essential asymmetry of progress at the
macro-level from the improbable macrostates to the more probable ones; the asym-
metry can be expressed by the law of ever-increasing entropy. The asymmetry of
nature related with respect to the time arrow may therefore be viewed as an emer-
gent phenomenon of the macroworld (cf. Section 6 below). An interesting example
of a topic addressed by statistical physics is a change occurring in the overall order
of a system – the so called phase transition. The most commonly known phase tran-
sition occurs between solid, liquid and gaseous phases of water, but there are much
more intricate cases in various other areas. In fact, a phase transition is a typical
example of a transdisciplinary phenomenon: in each case it involves the collective
behavior of a large number of elements. The nature of those elements may vary from
case to case – not only atoms or molecules, but also, for instance, leaves of water
lilies, burning trees, rabid foxes, and indecisive voters.
5. SCALES, LEVELS, AND HIERARCHIES
Previous examples of collective systems bring us to the trivial fact that a collection
occupies more space than its elements. In general, we are used to associate spatial
objects, relations and events with a certain scale. The world appears different on
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different scales – small scales, medium scales, and large scales – and we can talk
about shifting our attention or concern smoothly, from one scale to another, by
zooming in or zooming out – either in imagination, or, to a smaller extent, visually
(say, with the aid of microscopes or telescopes). In theory we can conceive of a special
coordinate axis, the space-scale axis, thereby adding an extra dimensionality to our
world [4]. Somewhere in the “middle” of the space-scale axis there is situated the
homely world of our everyday experience within our (human) space-scalar horizon.
Analogously to the space-scale axis we can think of the time-scale axis. Shifts
along it would correspond to changes of our concern either towards temporally
shorter events and durations (measured, e. g., in milliseconds, microseconds, and
less) or towards longer ones (measured, e. g., in years, centuries, and more). Simi-
larly to the space-scalar horizon, the time-scalar horizon of our everyday experience
is confined to intermediate temporal scales (seconds, hours, and days). An intuitive
analogy of spatial zooming in and zooming out can be now approached by imagining
the decelerated or accelerated flow of world events (as it is often done in educational
films).
It is interesting to note that typical space and time scales of many spatio-temporal
entities (lasting things, extended events, physical processes) studied by empirical
sciences are often mutually related. Metaphorically said, elephants live longer than
flies (which statement, of course, does not apply to supernovas or neutrinos).
The original human intuitions, ideas and concepts have evolved within and are
inherently linked to our space-time scalar horizons (and several other types of horizon
that I do not discuss here). Consequently, those scientific theories that invite us
to mental voyages into worlds unimaginably small or immensely large (or else too
slow or too fast) must be rather cautious about their use of language. They must
not fail to distinguish carefully three types of situation: first, when our everyday
language is used in a literal sense; second, when a metaphorical transfer of words
and idioms helps us to discuss things beyond the experiential horizon; and third,
when an entirely new ad hoc language has to be created.
Now let us consider objects that may be classified as complex. Preliminary and
somewhat minimal definition of a complex object may be based on the assumption
that it is stretched over a multitude of spatial and/or temporal scales. It turns
out that for such objects there is often a close relationship between its distribution
over scales and the hierarchy of its structural, functional, or descriptional levels.
Accordingly, Salthe [20] prefers the generic term scalar hierarchy whenever there is
a nontrivial collection of levels, each related to a specific scale. A particular case is
the mereological hierarchy, based on the part-whole distinction; indeed, apart from
trivial cases, wholes are always larger than their parts.
As scientists, we are typically realists about mereological differences between parts
and wholes (trees versus forests, water drops versus clouds, bees versus beehives,
neurons versus brains). In the same manner we might be inclined to be realists about
existence of, and differences between, various other types of discourse pertaining
to the world (more about that in Section 6). Yet, undoubtedly, we have a great
amount of freedom to fix the details of such differences. Our picture of the world is
a dynamical outcome of a never-ending circular hermeneutic process: our world is
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enacted (a term coined in cognitive science by Varela et al. [24], elaborated by Noë
[19] and widely used by Thompson [22]).
Two types of difficulty can be pointed to. The first one stems from our insuffi-
cient understanding of the nature of efficacious interactions, downward or upward,
between distinct (possibly distant) levels of complex hierarchical systems. The sec-
ond type of difficulty is related to the epistemological nature of the concept of level
per se. I will return to this in Section 10 where I will treat it in relation to a more
general concept of domain of discourse.
6. TWO–LEVEL SYSTEMS, EMERGENT PHENOMENA,
AND DOWNWARD CAUSATION
There are many situations, both in nature and in social sphere, when a certain
higher-level process evolving on a certain large, i. e., “slow” time scale is inherently
linked to, dependent on, and perhaps realized in combined behavior of a multitude of
lower-level processes or events, occurring each on much small, i. e., “fast” temporal
scale. Here I give seven willfully diverse examples, some taken from nature, others
from the human domain: (1) evolution of species vs. properties and life histories of
individual organisms; (2) macroeconomics vs. market behavior; (3) an epidemic vs.
particular cases of illness; (4) evolution of a language vs. speech acts; (5) history of
technology (or science) vs. concrete inventions (or discoveries); (6) development of
a legal system vs. particular court decisions; (7) evolving rules of a game vs. actual
matches.
While on the lower level we encounter specific, concrete and sometimes isolated
occurrences of individual entities or events, the corresponding upper-level entity
usually has a latent, symbolic, or non-material, but long-term existence. It is by
virtue of such a continuous nature of existence on the upper level that we may
consider each entity or event on the lower level as a manifestation of a single higher-
order entity (hence often the same term is used for both).
There may be a bi-directional, circular interaction between the two levels. For
instance, the upper level process may provide “rules of the game” for its lower-level
instances. Conversely, the lower-level events cumulatively influence the slow devel-
opment of the higher-level system. Even if the lower-level individuals are conscious
agencies with their own intentions and goals, they may not be aware of their influ-
ence on the upper-level process. The latter is then neither random nor controlled by
a single agency – its conduct and properties are emergent (i. e., neither deterministic
nor teleological in the narrow sense, but purposeful, cf. [8]). Due to such emer-
gence, the combined two-level system may exhibit an ability of self-construction or
self-improvement (these abilities are essential in autopoietic systems to be discussed
in Section 9).
The concept of emergence may be nicely illustrated by an example of evolution
based on the variation-selection-reproduction principle. Here the upward (bottom-
up) efficacy can be explained with the help of statistical laws; in general, however,
not only individual behavior may have higher-level effects, but also cooperation,
entanglement and other collective phenomena on lower level may initiate emergent
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processes on various higher levels. Thus, e. g., the growth of complexity of the
biosphere on Earth may be explained by a network of emergent processes on a
multitude of different scales.
So far we have dealt more with the upward efficacy (or causation) in two-level
systems. This may be, for purposes of theoretical treatment, relatively easily gener-
alized to multi-level systems. On the other hand, the idea of downward (or top-down,
or global-to-local) causation is much less understood. In certain cases its existence
is obvious, for instance in the case of a global-to-local symbolic communication
in human information society. Individuals learn about the global events and may
change their behavior accordingly (recall our examples of macroeconomics or of the
legal system). Individuals may even guide their behavior to comply with (putative)
higher-level interests and so, conceivably, their decisions on the lower level may will-
fully favor some desired, purposeful evolutionary path on the upper level (according
to the maxim “think globally and act locally”). This dynamics, sometimes called
the reflexivity of the system, is actually a closed multi-level feedback loop.
The idea of downward causation is extensively discussed in contemporary cogni-
tive science and philosophy of mind. What is at issue is how to explain that human
conscious decisions (considered to happen, in this case, on the higher, mental level)
may have instantaneous influence on neuronaly induced bodily behavior (think of,
e. g., voting by raising the hand). This theme, however, would extend beyond the
scope of this paper.
Let me close this section with one relatively precise definition of the concept
of emergence according to Thompson ([22, p. 418]): A network, N , of interrelated
components exhibits an emergent process, E, with emergent properties, P , if and
only if:
(1) E is a global process that instantiates P , and arises from the coupling of N ’s
components and the nonlinear dynamics, D, of their local interactions;
(2) E and P have a global-to-local (downward) determinative influence on the
dynamics D of the components of N ; and possibly
(3) E and P are not exhaustively determined by the intrinsic properties of the
components of N , that is, they exhibit “relational holism”.
7. CONNECTIONISM
Connectionism, neural network modeling or parallel distributed processing (PDP)
are several names for trends in cognitive science of late 20th century based on at-
tempts to concretize the ideas of emergence in collective systems. Connectionist
models are reminiscent of, and/or inspired by, the neural networks in the brain, and
are conceived as parallel-processing systems, involving cooperative “computations”
grounded in local interactions between connected units, modifiable by training or by
learning from past experience.
Many variants of connectionist models with different network topologies, unit
activity functions, learning rules, and teaching strategies have been introduced; some
models are deterministic, some involve noise or “temperature”, some are discrete,
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some continuous. Surprisingly enough, these variants exhibit more or less the same
type of global behavior.
On the lower level, a connectionist system is comprised of a number of units
(neuron-like elements). At every moment of time each unit is in a certain state
of activity, either excited or quiescent (alternatively, it may assume one value out
of a continuous segment of possible values). Some units are mutually connected;
each connection is associated with a weight, either positive (excitatory) or negative
(inhibitory). Local dynamics is specified by a uniform activation rule, typically
a nonlinear (threshold or sigmoid) function of the weighted sum of activities of
connected units. The weights of connections are assumed (in the more interesting
case) to increase incrementally when the activity of the corresponding pair of units is
correlated. Importantly, the change of connection weights is much slower comparing
to the changes of the activity of units. Thus a connectionist network can be viewed
not only as a special case of a two-level system from Section 6, but also as a pair of
coupled dynamic systems – one representing its locally defined fast active behavior,
the other its globally meaningful slower “learning” process.
According to the degree of the autonomy of units we can distinguish two opposite
modes of global behavior or, using the language of statistical physics, two phases: one
corresponding to the rigid system of inherently deterministic units, the other having
a chaotic and unpredictable global behavior. In a rigid system a new interesting
pattern (or idea, if you like) occurs with a great difficulty, while in the chaotic
system such a pattern (idea) is immediately dispersed. It is conceivable that under
proper settings of parameters (like density of connections, the ratio of excitatory and
the inhibitory ones, etc.) we obtain an intermediate system working on the “edge of
chaos” (i. e., near the boundary between the ordered and the chaotic behavior; to be
discussed in the next section). Then, for instance, a certain pattern may propagate
easily through large areas of the network. In physical systems similar situations are
known to exist near phase transitions (cf. Section 6).
Collective systems with highly parallel activity happen to be interesting alter-
natives to classical serial computational algorithms and overpower them in certain
tasks (like pattern recognition, learning, etc.). Collective systems may have ex-
tremely large combinatorial complexity (the number of macrostates grows exponen-
tially with the number of units). Such a complexity is not a disadvantage since it
yields redundancy and redundancy supports self-organization and self-improvement.
In a sense the theory of connectionist networks builds up on classical cybernetics by
elevating the productive effect of feedback to complex systems with a tremendous
number of interrelated feedback loops.
It is interesting to note that there exist recent theories in cognitive science in-
formed by neuroscience [1, 2]. Crudely said, instead of a single connectionist net-
work of individual neurons there is a collection of large neural populations, each of
which may spontaneously oscillate due to a sufficient number of inhibitory feedback
connections. This forms a higher-level network of oscillating units (neural popula-
tions) that mutually interact on a mesoscopic scale and under external influence may
change their oscillatory patterns or even enter into chaotic attractors. The theory
of complex dynamic systems is essential for the study of such multi-level networks.
322 I. M. HAVEL
8. ON THE EDGE OF CHAOS: RANDOM BOOLEAN NETWORKS
In the previous section we discussed a possibility of emergence of a nontrivial higher-
level behavior in a complex system. In particular we touched upon a conceivable
behavior on the edge of chaos. Such systems possess many interesting characteristics
that are meaningful, mutatis mutandis, in many different areas of natural sciences
as well as of social sciences. For instance, if certain parameters of a large complex
system obtain a specified value, a small local anomaly (e. g., a mutation, idea, intent,
slogan, joke, virus – depending on the domain of discourse) may spread very fast
across the whole system.
The connectionist models described in the previous section are just a special case
of a substrate prolific with collective phenomena. Another, considerably different
example is the random Boolean network introduced by Stuart Kauffman [12].
Kauffmann’s network consists of a large number of units, each instantiating a
randomly chosen Boolean function of a certain number of input connections coming
from other, randomly chosen units. Over a succession of moments the system passes
through a sequence of total states; this sequence can be associated with a trajectory
in the state space of the network. The state space is finite (even if, in general,
rather large) and thus each trajectory ends up in a limit cycle attractor. For certain
values of parameters (for instance the average number of inputs to an element, or
certain quantifiable characteristics of chosen Boolean functions) the system exhibits
a quasi-chaotic behavior (the cycle lengths of attractors grow exponentially with the
increasing number of units); for other values the behavior is “ordered” (there are
only small isolated groups of changeable units within a large web of elements that
are “frozen” in one state or the other). Thus the system has two phases, one chaotic
and the other ordered. Interesting dynamic behavior emerges when the network is
near the phase-transition area in the parameter space – then, typically, both small
and large unfrozen groups coexist. A small perturbation (e. g., a random change of
the state of some unit) may cause a large avalanche of changes propagating through
the network. In this way distant sites in the network can “communicate”. Moreover,
these special modes of behavior have homeostatic quality: structural mutations of
the system do not considerably affect its dynamic behavior.
This was an example of a rather different system in comparison to the neuron-like
connectionist network, yet with interesting emergent and unpredictable properties
that resemble various collective phenomena.
9. AUTOPOIESIS: AN APPROACH TO THE PHENOMENON OF LIFE
The issue of the difference between living organisms and physical things is perma-
nently in the focus of philosophers and scientists. There were various recent attempts
to find necessary or sufficient conditions of something being alive; an instance of one
of the relatively well-known approaches is that pursued by Kauffman [13, 14]. Here
I want to mention another approach which became familiar under the term “au-
topoiesis”.
The theory of autopoiesis was first formulated by Maturana and Varela [17] who
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originally aimed at the question of what is the minimal organization of living systems
that would make them different from merely physical (natural or artificial) objects.
By (simplified) definition, a system is autopoietic if it satisfies the following three
conditions ([22, p. 101], here slightly modified):
(1) The system has a semipermeable boundary;
(2) The boundary is produced by a network of processes that take place within
the boundary;
(3) The network of processes must include processes that regenerate the compo-
nents of the system (as well as the boundary).
The paradigm case of an autopoietic system is a cell, at least if it is described as
a network of chemical reactions producing molecules that, due to their interactions,
generate, and participate recursively in the same network of reactions that produced
them, and moreover, realize the cell as a material unity. This unity is established by
the cell membrane that forms its semipermeable boundary, being itself a product of
internal reactions within the cell.
In fact, the cell was the original inspiration for the notion of autopoiesis; the
notion, however, applies also to embodied organisms, animals, and human beings.
Then chemical reactions are supplemented with much more complex processes, up
to sensorimotor and cognitive interactions with the environment. The ladder of life
can not only be climbed upward but also downward. On the lowest partitions of
the ladder the researcher leaves nature behind and resorts to computer simulations,
under the banner of Artificial Life. As a matter of fact, certain minimal variants
of autopoietic systems were already realized in computer-simulated two-dimensional
cellular automata ([18], cf. also [22, pp. 107–118]).
In autopoietic systems there is a characteristic circular interdependency between
various self-regulating processes on the one side, and the self-production of a bound-
ary whereby the system forms a spatially distinct individual on the other side. Hence
autopoiesis is a condition of possibility of dynamic emergence of interiority, in dis-
tinction to the external milieu. The dynamical character of autopoiesis is essential:
the components needed for the constituent processes are continually re-created and
the same holds for the boundary (which is one of the components of the system).
Thus the difference between the system and its environment is maintained.
Autopoietic systems can be considered as a special case of autonomous systems,
the latter not necessarily caring of its own material boundary. Thus other types
of organizationally, or operationally closed systems whose boundaries are, say, only
social or territorial (like ecosystems, insect colonies, human societies) may be au-
tonomous but not autopoietic.
In the context of this study it is worth mentioning that several principal features
of autopoietic systems have a typically cybernetic flavor: reciprocal links, levels,
self-reproduction, nonlinear dynamics, and autonomy. What is even more akin to
the original program of cybernetics, is that autopoietic theory, by offering a notion
of minimal bodily “selfhood” or self-concern, is opening up the grounds for thoughts
about bridging the explanatory gap between two large domains of discourse, that of
physics and that of biology. Thompson ([22, p. 238]) argues for an expanded notion of
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the physical to account for the organism or living being. According to him, “life is not
physical in the standard materialist sense of purely external structure and function.
Life realizes a kind of interiority, the interiority of selfhood and sense-making.” He
goes even further, proposing what he calls the deep continuity of life and mind thesis,
according to which “life and mind share a set of basic organizational properties, and
the organizational properties distinctive of mind are an enriched version of those
fundamental of life.” (p. 128). However interesting this line of thought is, there is no
space to elaborate on it here.
When discussing basic aspects of the living, one should not forget that self-
production is not yet self-reproduction (producing its own copies). Some authors
take self-reproducibility (e. g., the preservation of the continuity of a species) for
a part of the definition of life – if for nothing else than as a precondition for the
variation-selection-reproduction principle of evolution (as mentioned in Section 6).
Self-reproduction, even if it is not included in the definition of autopoietic systems,
is by no means an alien theme. Perhaps it is appropriate at this place to mention a
lecture given by John von Neumann in 1948 (hence also something to be celebrated),
in which he laid down the foundations of a formal theory of self-reproducing systems
that can be, in principle, artificially realized in cellular automata [23].
10. DOMAINS OF DISCOURSE AND CAUSAL DOMAINS
In Section 5 above I mentioned the concept of a level, or a hierarchy of levels, in
somewhat restricted form, related primarily to spatio-temporal scales. In scientific
as well as philosophical literature there are frequent references to levels in a more
profound sense. Thus, for instance, in sciences distinctions are made between the
atomic level, molecular level, cellular level, neural level, etc., up to the mental level
(cf., e. g., Scott [21]), and perhaps further to behavioral level, and societal level. Yet
we are left alone with our intuition about what is precisely meant under the term
“level”. Judging from the usage, the only general, common feature of all levels is
their epistemological sense: they indicate much better understanding, on the side of
researchers, of relationships and laws within a particular level rather than between
different levels.
I prefer to use the term domain of discourse instead of the term level and I have
two reasons for this. First, it may be advantageous to suppress the tacit assumption
of the existence of some underlying hierarchy of levels (where some levels are usually
called “upper” and some others are called “lower”) and prefer the term “domain of
discourse” suggesting a substantially more general conceptual setting. The second
reason is that the very word “discourse” aptly suggests that at least partly we deal
with an observer-relative concept (see the end of this section). In fact, decades and
centuries of specialization in science lead to various linguistic and methodological
barriers between fields dealing with different domains of discourse. Here a revival of
a transdisciplinary endeavor put forth by the founders of cybernetics is something
to be desired.
Domains of discourse may be exemplified by particular subject areas of natural
science (like, for instance, quantum physics, molecular biology, or evolutionary biol-
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ogy) and the fields delimited by different research methods. More or less anything
we find in scientific and philosophical discourse that is designated, or recognized
as, a “level”, falls under the concept of domain of discourse. In scientific contexts
domains (of discourse) and levels (of description) are typically shaped by intersub-
jectively shared knowledge.
Each domain of discourse can be viewed as a world for itself: it has specific
individuals, universals, properties, aspects, relations, laws, etc. Such things may be
peculiar to one particular domain, other things may belong to, or be meaningful in,
several, perhaps many, domains – they are multidomain entities or shared concepts.
Multidomain entities, so to speak, “penetrate” through many different domains;
typical examples are living organisms. In contrast, certain generic concepts may
be shared by various domains, i. e. they may have analogous, or even the “same”,
meaning in various domains, partly due to their generality, partly due to the limita-
tions of our language. Obvious examples are the concepts of space, time, causality,
and most mathematical abstractions.
A typical domain of discourse lacks sharp borders, and what we count or do not
count as part of it depends on how far its concepts, quantities, laws, and paradigms
are significant. So, instead of a border, we deal with the notion of a domain horizon
of which the spatio-temporal scale horizon discussed above is a specific component.
In the scientific enterprise one specific aspect of the concept of domain of discourse
is particularly important, namely its causal underpinning. As a matter of fact, in
the sciences all explanations and predictions are preferably based on causal laws that
generalize the intuitive idea of one event (or state of affairs), – the cause – bringing
about another event (or state of affairs) – the effect, whenever this “bringing about”
is not assumed to happen just by coincidence. In contexts where causal efficacy is
the main issue, it is advantageous to use a somewhat restrictive concept of a causal
domain, instead of, or in addition to, the concept of domain of discourse.
We can think of a causal domain as of any segment (or fragment, or component)
of reality within the scope of which causal relations appear to be (i. e., are presented
to our knowledge as) manifest (obvious, apparent), comprehensible (intelligible),
and mutually coherent. Or, more appropriately, they appear to be more manifest,
more comprehensible, and mutually more coherent than causal relations between
different domains. This formulation is admittedly vague but intuitively favorable;
the implicit circularity should not be a hindrance. According to the traditional view,
causes are events antecedent to their effects. Moreover, some theoreticians maintain
that whenever one event causes another, it does so in accordance with a general
law. The above concept of a causal domain (the term was used casually by Kim [15,
p. 69]) deliberately presumes causation in the ordinary narrower sense (sometimes it
is called the left-to-right causation). In fact, this enables us to make a distinction
from a more general concept of efficacy (discussed already in Section 6), the latter
applicable also to various relations between events of different domains of discourse
(the upward or downward causations may serve as examples).
One may, of course, ask about the actual reality of causal domains, as well as of
the reality of various levels and hierarchies within a complex system. Do they exist
as ontological categories independent of our choice of presumably relevant objects,
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events and scales, or are they products of theoretical abstraction? There is no place
here to venture into metaphysical issues; let me just remind that the horizon of
human cognitive abilities and experience makes it difficult for us to mentally grasp
at the same time more than a rather narrow spectrum of domains, or in particular,
limited range of scales. For this (and other) reasons it is quite natural that scientists
are compelled to think of the world as composed of various domains of discourse
and of various structural and/or functional levels. Obvious differences between do-
mains then yield different descriptions, different languages and, eventually, different
disciplines. In this sense the concept of a domain of discourse is observer-relative.
11. CYBERNETICS IS STILL ALIVE
Of course, the few areas of the past and current research, discussed in the previ-
ous sections, are far from giving an exhaustive list of themes that could be viewed,
in one or another way, as successors of the Good Old Cybernetics. There are two
common features of our themes: first, that they are directly or indirectly built up
on the original cybernetic ideas (feedback, homeostasis, etc.), and second, that they
exemplify a genuine transdisciplinary scholarship. In many respects the presented
directions of research converge on the ubiquitous and multifaceted notions of sys-
temhood, structure, dynamics, and last but not least, complexity.
There was a peculiar hidden vivacity in old cybernetics, which is yet to be sub-
jected to thorough analysis by historians of science. Its traces luckily endured
through the six decades after the late forties in the less manifest layers in various
other areas, mainly in those that are directly or indirectly concerned with dynamic
and evolving entities – natural, artificial, or formal. Part of the vivacity can be at-
tributed to effective use of abstract mathematical apparatus in new areas of study.
I believe there is also another, less formal component of the vivacity, namely the
strong heuristic power of metaphors.
Certain names of concepts, phenomena, relations, structures and regularities,
originally introduced in one particular field, are helping to build bridges between
various diverse scientific disciplines and paradigms. Transdisciplinarity at its best.
Whole areas of study emerged in this way: cybernetics itself, but also system science,
science of complexity, cognitive science, artificial life, and many others. Metaphors
may induce, or already have induced, interesting discoveries and hypotheses that
otherwise would hardly come to our minds. In other words, metaphors have the
potential of triggering new streams of thought. Cybernetics and its follow-up styles
of scientific discovery are both receivers and providers of strong scientific metaphors.
The mysterious flavor of such metaphors lies in their ability to find similarities among
dissimilarities and thus to create a tension between likeness and difference.
Whether or not the post-cybernetic trends will converge into a new, not yet
established discipline, and whichever name it may eventually adopt, one thing can
be put forth: cybernetic thinking has not disappeared after Wiener’s time, it is still
striding strongly.
Sixty Years of Cybernetics: Cybernetics Still Alive 327
R E F E R E N C E S
[1] G. M. Edelman and G. Tononi: A Universe of Consciousness. Basic Books, New York
2000.
[2] W. J. Freeman: How Brains Make Up Their Minds. Columbia University Press, New
York 2000.
[3] I. M. Havel: Artificial intelligence and connectionism: Some philosophical implications.
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